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Pursuant to the Court/s minute entry, Rule 35 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Court's order granting an 
extension of time, defendant/appellee B & B Amusement Corp. 
("B & B") hereby responds to plaintiff/appellant's petition for 
rehearing. 
INTRODUCTION 
Rehearing need not be granted since all of plaintiff's 
arguments in her petition can be rejected upon the grounds that 
plaintiff opened the door to the admission of evidence she now 
contests. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM 
THAT B & B SHOULD HAVE BEEN BARRED FROM CONTENDING 
THAT CO-DEFENDANT CURTIS WAS AT FAULT 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims to the contrary, this Court 
need not consider and modify its opinion to address the argument 
raised by plaintiff that the Arizona Appellate Court decision in 
Matusik v, Arizona Public Service Co., 684 P.2d 882 (Ariz. App. 
1984), compels the conclusion that "it was fundamentally unfair for 
the trial court to allow B & B to put on trial evidence and 
argument regarding [dismissed defendant] Curtis's fault after the 
trial court had ruled that there could, as a matter of law, be no 
fault ascribed to Curtis [sic]." (See plaintiffs petition for 
rehearing at pp. 2-3.) This is so since: (1) the special verdict 
form presented to the jury, to which plaintiff's counsel agreed, 
did not allow the jury an opportunity to apportion fault of the 
dismissed defendant, Curtis; (2) defendant B & B did not 
specifically argue the fault of Curtis; (3) B & B was properly 
allowed to argue alternate causes for the bolt failure once 
plaintiff herself opened the door to the very evidence which 
plaintiff contends should not have been admitted; and (4) plaintiff 
has misread Matusik, while ignoring that body of case law 
supportive of the trial court's conclusion herein. 
As to Point I above, the special verdict form prepared for the 
jury and returned from the same read as follows: 
We, the jury in the above entitled case, 
deliver the following answers to the questions 
submitted to us: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Was B & B Amusements 
negligent? 
Answer "yes" or "no". 
ANSWER: No. 
QUESTION NO. 2: Was B & B Amusements' 
negligence a proximate cause of injury to 
Tammy Lamb? 
Answer "yes" or "no". 
ANSWER: 
If you answer Question Nos. 1 and 2 "no," 
sign and return this verdict. 
If you answer Question Nos. 1 and 2 
"yes," then answer Question No. 3. 
QUESTION NO. 3: What is the total amount 
of "Category 1" damages (as defined in 
Instruction No. ) suffered by Tammy Lamb 
as proximate results of the accident? 
ANSWER: 
QUESTION NO. 4: What is the total amount 
of "Category 2" damages (as defined in 
Instruction No. ) suffered by Tammy Lamb 
as proximate results of the accident? 
ANSWER: 
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QUESTION NO. 5: Did Ms. Lamb fail, to 
any degree, reasonably to mitigate her damages 
from the accident? 
Answer "yes" or \ 
ANSWER: If you answer 
Question No. 4 "yes," then answer the 
following question. If you answer Question 
No. 4 "no," sign and return this verdict. 
QUESTION NO. 6: By what amount, if any, 
do you find that Ms. Lamb failed to mitigate 
her damages through reasonable efforts? 
ANSWER: 
DATED: Sept. 4. 1990 Frank R. Davis 
FOREPERSON 
(See R. at 399-400 % Furthermore, prior to oral argument in Ihis 
case the following interchange occurred between the court and 
counsel: 
THE COURT: " Collins [plaintiff's 
attorney], you#ve seen the Special Verdict the 
court intends to use. Are there any problems 
or exceptions with it? 
MR. COLLINS [plaintiff's counsel] Not with 
the special verdict, Your Honor 
(See H 'hi ) And contrary ; plaintiff's implication 
otherwise, <*- closing argument II IK B'* counsel 1 
dismissed defendant Curtis was specifically responsible tor 
p 1 ii i l i t ; L f t ' * i 11\ i nit 11 in mi | i i r. i P M . 
Given *•• above, plaintiff cannot contend that the trial court 
improperly allowed the jury to apportion fault nondefendant, 
C i J i i l i s . A n Il i I 1 I II in 11 in mi 11 I  in I III mi I M I I i I I l e d i ill I k i . J . - . t . J c o u l a i Grain 
Co. of Utah, I n c . , 853 P. 2d 877 , 878 (Ii 1 ,ih 1993) an 
xIn her petition for rehearing plaintiff has ™ cited the 
Court to its decision in Sullivan. 
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individual or entity dismissed from a case pursuant to an 
adjudication on the merits of the liability issue may not be 
included in the apportionment" (footnote omitted), that case does 
not apply since, even if B & B had argued Curtis7s fault to the 
juryf Sullivan was decided after the jury entered its verdict in 
this case and there is no evidence that Curtis's proportionate 
share of faultf if any, was "included in the apportionment." 
Indeed, although not expressly stated in her petition for 
rehearing, plaintiff is asking the Court to acknowledge therein her 
speculation that the jury must have concluded that Curtis was at 
fault in this case. Yet, based upon the undisputed facts set forth 
in defendants appellate brief at paragraphs 24-30 and 35 (pp. 13-
14, 17), the jury could have just as likely concluded that 
defendant was not negligent in this case and plaintiff had suffered 
no damages (required for a prima facie claim) since: (1) she had 
lost her job prior to the accident; (2) she had suffered before the 
accident from headaches, back pain, trouble sleeping and stiffness 
and spasms in the neck; (3) prior to the accident she had been 
involved in an automobile accident where her leg and shoulder had 
been injured; (4) prior to the accident she had fallen while water 
skiing and had hurt her back while playing volleyball; (5) prior to 
the accident she had confirmed with physicians her physical 
problems including those enumerated above and weakness, dizziness, 
trouble with seeing, eye pain, double vision, ringing in the ears, 
nausea, vomiting, abdominal pains and musculoskeletal concerns; 
(6) prior to the accident plaintiff was taking strong pain 
medication; and (7) at the time of the accident the impact involved 
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therein was as nominal and equivalent to stopping at a stop sign in 
a normal way without sliding. (See defendant's brief at 13-14f 
17.) 
In short, had plaintiff or her counsel believed from the 
jury's verdict that the jury impermissibly attributed fault to 
Curtis, plaintiff could have requested that the Court address this 
belief with the jury before plaintiff agreed that the jury could be 
dismissed. Plaintiff's speculation that the jury based its verdict 
on Curtis's fault is an impermissible argument for reversal. See 
generally First Security Bank v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 1326, 1334 (Utah 
1990); id. at 1340 (Howe, J., dissenting) (sheer speculation that 
jury disregarded evidence). 
Second, in claiming that "it was fundamentally unfair for the 
trial court to allow B & B to put on trial evidence and argument 
regarding Curtis's fault after the trial court ruled that there 
could, as a matter of law, be no fault ascribed to Curtis [sic]" 
(see plaintiff's petition at pp. 2-3), plaintiffs are essentially 
claiming that the Court erred in allowing Dr. Blotter (defendant's 
expert) to testify that a defective bolt may have caused the injury 
and to allow such testimony after the defendant who allegedly 
manufactured the bolt had been awarded summary judgment in this 
case. 
In making this claim, however, plaintiff ignores in her 
petition for rehearing that she opened the door to this testimony 
through examining her own expert witness at trial. Specifically, 
as noted in defendant's initial appeal brief: 
18. Plaintiff presented the testimony of 
David Clark Stephens, her accident 
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reconstructionist, who testified that the case 
was relatively simple. (R. 549 at 146.) He 
discussed a "fault-tree analysis" which he 
stated was a method of system safety 
engineering or looking at all the possible 
causes for accidents. (R. 549 at 146-52.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Stephens testified regarding 
application of the bolts in question including 
their intended tensile strength and designed 
ability to withstand force. Mr. Stephens was 
then asked by plaintiff's counsel to discuss 
his fault-tree analysis with respect to the 
alleged coupling-device failure and alleged 
lap-bar failure of the car behind. (R. 549 at 
153-59.) In addressing the question posed by 
plaintiff's counsel himself, plaintiff's own 
expert testified that the bolt could have 
broken. (R. 549 at 188-89.) 
19. Thereafter, . . . plaintiff's expert 
volunteered that one of the possibilities for 
the failure was a defective bolt due to 
"hydrogen impregnation during cadmium plating 
of a bolt while it is being manufactured," 
which, as plaintiff's expert testified, was 
"the only other possibility [for the accident] 
that even [B & B's expert was] going to be 
able to come up with." (R. 549 at 198.) 
20. Upon cross-examination, plaintiff's 
own expert again stressed without objection by 
plaintiff that the most probable defect in a 
bolt would be one resulting from hydrogen 
impregnation and that he "recognize[d] that a 
flaw could exist in the wire that the bolt was 
manufactured out of." (R. 549 at 221.) 
21. Plaintiff's own expert also offered 
on cross-examination the following testimony: 
"I am sure that if the bolt had a flaw that 
reduced the tensile strength by 80 percent, it 
would never get sold on the open market." (R. 
549 at 222.) And plaintiff's expert admitted 
that there are such things as "Taiwanese 
counterfeit bolts." (R. 549 at 222-23.) 
23. Further, during re-direct 
plaintiff's counsel himself continued to ask 
questions of plaintiff's expert regarding the 
defective manufacturing of bolts and elicited 
the testimony that the problem with 
counterfeit bolts was "that the basic strength 
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of material is reduced, so that with either 
shear or tension, it is going to have a lower 
failure value." (R. 549 at 239-40.) 
(See R. 549 at 146-59, 188-89, 196-98, 221-23, 239-40; cited in 
defendant's appeal brief at pp. 10-12.) 
It was only after this plaintiff herself presented this 
testimony during her case in chief and through plaintiff's expert 
witness that defense expert Dr. Blotter testified, without 
objection, concerning the issue of counterfeit bolts and the flaws 
and failings regarding the manufacture of the same. (See R. 550 at 
385-87, 405-07, 417-26; cited at defendant's appeal memorandum pp. 
16-17.) Importantly, on cross-examination plaintiff's counsel 
again opened the door to this issue by asking Dr. Blotter to 
further discuss the issue of counterfeit and flawed bolts. (See R. 
550 at 449, 452, 456, 468-70; cited in defendant's appeal brief at 
11 36 p. 17.) 
As the Utah Court of Appeals noted in State v. Pacheco, 778 
P.2d 26 (Utah App. 1989), the admission of otherwise inadmissible 
evidence has been held to not constitute reversible error where one 
party opens the door for its admission, as "reference to or use by 
[a party] of an erroneously admitted line of evidence ordinarily 
cures or waives error." (See id. at 30 (quoted and cited cases 
omitted).) 
In short, plaintiff cannot contend that the trial court erred 
in allowing defendant's expert witness to present evidence as to 
defective bolts (and in allowing the jury to draw inferences 
therefrom) when plaintiff herself opened the door to this evidence, 
cross-examined the defense expert on this point, failed to 
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contemporaneously object at trial to Dr. Blotter's opinions in this 
regard, and where there is no evidence that the jury even found the 
nonparty (Curtis) at fault or apportioned any fault away from 
B & B. 
Third, in citing the Court to the Arizona appellate decision 
in Matusik, plaintiff ignores or misunderstands the fact that: 
(1) that case and plaintiff's quoted cite are inapposite since it 
involved a suit and issues for damages against co-defendants as 
implicitly recognized in J.W. Hancock Enterprises v, Arizona State 
Regency, 690 P.2d 119, 129 (Ariz. App. 1984) (citing Matusik for 
the proposition that the court's holding therein barred 
relitigation between parties who had asserted claims against each 
other); (2) plaintiff is speculating that upon remand defendant 
Curtis will raise and the trial court will allow defendant Curtis 
to argue that B & B was at fault (no apportionment would be allowed 
under this Court's decision in Sullivan): (3) Matusik did not 
involve the relitigation of a decision by the trial court 
dismissing the plaintiff's theory against a single co-defendant; 
(4) Matusik does not address the fact here that plaintiff herself 
opened the door to evidence of a potential alternate cause of her 
injury, namely that the bolt had been improperly manufactured; 
(5) once plaintiff in this case learned before trial of B & B's 
intent to have Dr. Blotter testify to alternate causation for 
plaintiff's damages, namely the defective manufacture of the bolt, 
plaintiff could have moved for an interlocutory appeal from the 
trial court's dismissal of her action against defendant Curtis— 
which request for appeal could have avoided plaintiff's claim that 
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defendant B & B was allowed to shift the blame at trial; and 
(7) plaintiff has ignored the overwhelming case law refuting the 
Court's opinion in Matusik. 
Indeed, as to the first and last points listed above, the 
Court is referred to Gates Leer Jet Corp. v. Duncan Aviation, 851 
F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1988) (one defendant not bound by issues 
litigated between plaintiff and another defendant as long as no 
adversity existed between defendants and no claim between them was 
brought in issue, litigated and determined); State of Alabama v. 
United States Environmental Protection Agency, 911 F.2d 499 (11th 
Cir. 1990) (defendant State of Alabama in first suit not prohibited 
as plaintiff in second suit from suing co-defendant since State of 
Alabama not bound by trial court's decision in first suit that 
plaintiff therein had failed to state claim against co-defendant); 
Franklin Stainless Corp. v. Mario Transport Corp., 748 F.2d 865 
(4th Cir. 1984) (defendant not required to oppose co-defendant's 
motion for dismissal in first case in order for defendant to sue 
co-defendant in second case). See also Wood v. Sympson, 833 P.2d 
1239 (Okla. 1992) (judgment against one defendant settles nothing 
between co-defendants unless conflicting or hostile claims are 
brought in issue through cross-petition or separate or adverse 
answer or were actually litigated and adjudicated); National 
Farmers Union Property v. Frackelton, 662 P.2d 1056 (Colo. 1983) 
("it is essential that parties should be adversaries among 
themselves before being bound by a judgment"; error for trial court 
to bind plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action to the jury's 
finding of relative fault in a prior action to which plaintiff was 
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not a party); Williams v. Evans. 552 P.2d 876 (Kan* 1976) (in order 
for co-defendants in prior action to be adverse parties in later 
action, they must be on opposite sides of issue as raised by 
appropriate cross-pleadings among themselves; it is insufficient to 
bar later claims if by separate answers co-defendants deny 
liability and claim accident was due to negligence of other)• Cf. 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co, v. Geary, 230 U.A.R. 38, 38f 41 n.4 
(Utah App. 1994) (third party to contract in declaratory relief 
action not barred by effect of defaulting defendant). 
Based upon this case law, even if the decision in Matusik was 
properly cited and applicable, it would be erroneous for this Court 
to rule that B & B should have opposed Curtis's motion for summary 
judgment so that it could later present evidence in response to 
plaintiff's own expert witness that the manufacturer of the bolt in 
question was the cause of plaintiff's injury. 
POINT II 
THE COURT NEED NOT MODIFY ITS OPINION 
TO ADDRESS ANY ADDITIONAL ISSUES 
SURROUNDING TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S EXPERT 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims to the contrary, this Court 
need not revise its opinion to address the issues plaintiff now 
raises as to: (1) whether B & B is prohibited from responding to 
testimony presented by plaintiff's expert as to the manufacturing 
of the bolts when defendant did not supplement its answers to 
plaintiff's interrogatories prior to trial; (2) whether plaintiff 
need make a contemporaneous objection to evidence sought to be 
admitted at trial when plaintiff opened the door to the 
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admissibility of such evidence; and (3) the issue of how an 
opposing party opens the door to the admission of such evidence. 
Although not cited by plaintiff, even this Court's dicta in 
State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989), is inapplicable where 
this Court generally noted that in order to preserve an issue 
challenging the admission of evidence at trial the criminal 
defendant need not make a specific objection at trial to the 
evidence where a pretrial motion to suppress has been made and 
denied by the same trial judge. That case did not involve the 
issue here where (as discussed supra) plaintiff herself opened the 
door to the admission of the very testimony she claims was 
prejudicial to her case. 
This Court has long recognized the "contemporaneous objection" 
rule which essentially requires a party to object to the admission 
of any evidence each time the opposing party seeks to admit the 
same. If the Court accepts plaintiff's argument on appeal, a party 
would be allowed to file a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the 
admissibility of certain evidence, open the door at trial to that 
testimony through her own expert, and then contest the fact that 
the defense responds with that evidence plaintiff claims is 
inadmissible. Further, to ignore the contemporaneous objection 
rule would allow a party to claim that all it needs do is object 
once to the requested admission of prohibited evidence in order to 
preserve its argument on appeal when the evidence later comes in 
over that party's silent acquiescence. 
Further, based upon the undisputed facts set forth in 
defendant's initial brief on appeal, plaintiff cannot competently 
11 
argue that she was unaware that defendant would attempt to admit 
evidence of a defective bolt given the appropriate opportunity. 
(See defendant's initial memorandum at factual paragraphs 3, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 10, and 13.) And, since plaintiff cannot claim that she did 
not open the door to such evidence, this Court need not revise its 
opinion at plaintiff's request that the Court educate the bar as to 
the scope of the "open door" rule. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS PLAINTIFF#S THEORY 
THAT A REASONABLE JURY COULD NOT HAVE 
FOUND THAT B & B WAS NOT NEGLIGENT 
On Page 5 of plaintiff's petition for rehearing she encourages 
this Court to analyze whether a reasonable jury should have found 
that B & B was not negligent. The Court need not consider this 
claim, however, since as set forth in defendant's initial brief on 
appeal: (1) plaintiff failed to meet her burden on appeal of 
marshalling all evidence in support of the jury's verdict before 
claiming the insufficiency thereof (see defendant's initial brief 
at pp. 44-45); (2) any error was harmless given the incredible and 
unbelievable evidence offered by plaintiff at trial (see 
defendant's initial memorandum at pp. 40-44); and (3) any error was 
harmless given evidence of flawed bolts provided by plaintiff's own 
expert and plaintiff's lack of surprise concerning such evidence 
(see defendant's initial memorandum at pp. 38-40). 
POINT IV 
THE "DYNAMICS" OF THIS CASE ARE NOT "PECULIAR" 
AND DO NOT JUSTIFY A NEW TRIAL IN THIS MATTER 
Notwithstanding plaintiff's claims to the contraryf the 
"dynamics" of this case are not "peculiar" and do not warrant a new 
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trial. Although plaintiff wishes to reassert the noncontrolling 
opinion in Westinqhouse Elevator Co. v. Herron, S21 A,M J \ (Pa. 
1987) (cited on pp. 5-6 of plaintiff's petition for rehearing), 
defendant has already demonstrated to the Court that application of 
this case is inappropriate in compelling B k H ID I et i y ' lu matter 
when the trial court committed no error in reaching its verdict in 
B & B's favor. As set forth in Scott v. Webb, 641 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 1982) (cited on p. 25 of plaintiff's initial memorandum), 
plaintiff has had her day in court with respect to defendant B & B 
and absent ieversible error she cannot force B & B to relitigate 
the issues again. Certainly, immediately after the Court granted 
defendant Curtis summary judgment, plaintiff was aware of the risks 
of trying this case only against h ht II and was already aware that 
B & B claimed the injury was caused by the bolt manufacturer (see 
B & B's initial brief at pp. 6-9). Nevertheless, plaintiff made a 
conscious choice not to move for an interlocutory appeal t c> obtain 
review and possible reversal of Curtis's dismissal so that she 
could avoid any prejudice from trying this case against B k B 
alone. Plaintiff's tactical decision regarding trying this lawsuit 
against only B & B should not ultimately work to B & B's prejudice. 
Finally, plaintiff is requesting that this Court force B & B 
to retry this case even though no error was committed in its favor 
since plaintiff believes that without B k B present at trial 
defendant Curtis will be absolved from liability by claiming that 
B & B was at fault. Nevertheless, in essentially making this claim 
and contending that such potential by Curtis at trial creates a 
"peculiar dynamic" warranting a new trial against B k Br plaintiff 
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ignores the fact that she is only speculating that defendant Curtis 
will attempt such approach and be successful in the same. This 
"speculation" by plaintiff as to what could happen if on remand she 
is forced to try this lawsuit only against defendant Curtis does 
not merit a reversal of an error-free judgment in B & B's favor* 
CONCLUSION 
Since this Court has sufficiently addressed plaintiff's issues 
on appeal and inasmuch as plaintiff's arguments in her petition for 
rehearing center around the admissibility of evidence to which 
plaintiff herself opened the door, this Court should deny 
plaintiff's petition for rehearing. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /( day of 
1994. 
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